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INTRODUCTION
Non-malleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [DPW10] , provide a useful message integrity guarantee in situations where traditional error-correction (and even error-detection) is impossible; for example, when the attacker can completely overwrite the encoded message. Informally, given a tampering family F, a F-non-malleable code (E, D) encodes a given message x into a codeword y ← E(x) in a way that, if y is modified into y = f (y) by some f ∈ F, then the message x = D(y ) contained in the modified codeword y is either the original message x, or a completely "unrelated value". In other words, non-malleable codes aim to handle a much larger class of tampering functions F than traditional error-correcting or error-detecting codes, at the expense of potentially allowing the attacker to replace a given message x by an unrelated message x (and also necessarily allowing for a small "simulation error" ε). As shown by [DPW10] , this relaxation still makes nonmalleable codes quite useful in a variety of situations where (a) the tampering capabilities of the attacker might be too strong for error-detection, and, yet (b) changing x to unrelated x is not useful for the attack. For example, imagine x being a secret key for a signature scheme. In this case, tampering which keeps x the same corresponds to the traditional chosen message attack (covered by the traditional definition of secure signatures), while tampering which changes x to an unrelated value x will clearly not help in forging signatures under the original (un-tampered) verification key, as the attacker can produce such signatures under x by himself.
Split-State Model.
Although such codes do not exist if the family of "tampering functions" F is completely unrestricted, 1 they are known to exist for many broad tampering families F. One such natural family is the family of tampering functions in the so called t-split-state model S t n . Here the k-bit message x is encoded into t shares y1, . . . , yt of length n each, and the attacker is allowed to arbitrarily tamper with each yi individually. The rate of such an encoding is naturally defined as τ = tn/k.
The appeal of this family comes from the fact that it seems naturally enforceable in applications, especially when t is low and the shares y1, . . . , yt are stored in different parts of memory, or by different parties. Alternatively, non-malleable codes in this model could be interpreted as "non-malleable secret-sharing schemes": even if all the t message shares are independently tampered with, the recovered message is either x or is unrelated to x. Not surprisingly, the setting of t = 2 appears the most useful (but also the most challenging from the technical point of view), so it received the most attention so far [DPW10, LL12, DKO13, ADL14, CG14a, CG14b] .
The known results can be summarized as follows. First, [DPW10] showed the existence of such non-malleable codes, and this existential result was further improved by [CG14a] , who (amazingly!) showed that the optimal rate of such codes is just 2. Second, the work of [DPW10] also gave an efficient construction in the random oracle model. Third, the work of Liu and Lysyanskaya [LL12] built an efficient computationally-secure non-malleable code in the split model (necessarily restricting the tampering functions f1 and f2 to be efficient as well). The construction assumes so called common reference string (CRS) which cannot be tampered, and also uses quite heavy tools from public-key cryptography, such as robust non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [DSDCO + 01] and leakage-resilient encryption [NS09] . Thus, given the clean information-theoretic definition of non-malleable codes, we believe it is important to construct such codes unconditionally.
This was first achieved by Dziembowski, Kazana and Obremski [DKO13] , who constructed an elegant non-malleable code for 1-bit messages in the split-state model. Following that, Aggarwal, Dodis and Lovett [ADL14] gave the first informationtheoretic construction supporting k-bit messages, but where the length of each share n = O(k 7 log 7 k) [ADL14] . The security proof of this scheme also used pretty advanced results 1 In particular, F should not include "re-encoding functions" f (y) = E(f (D(y))) for any non-trivial function f , as x = D(f (E(y))) = f (x) is obviously related to x. from additive combinatorics, including the so called Quasipolynomial Freiman-Ruzsa Theorem, which was recently established by Sanders [San12] as a step towards resolving the Polynomial Freiman-Ruzsa conjecture [Gre05] . This construction was improved by Aggarwal [Agg15] to obtain nonmalleable codes in the split state model with n = O(k 7 ). Very recently Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ14] construct a constant-rate non-malleable code in the 9-split-state model. However, it was unclear how to reduce the number of independent parts to the optimal 2.
Hence, prior to our work, the following question remained open: construct efficient, information-theoretically secure non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model whose rate is o(k 6 ) (and, ideally, constant).
Our Results.
In this work, we resolve this open problem.
Theorem 1 (Main Result). (Informal) There exists efficient, information-theoretically secure non-malleable codes in the 2-split-state model with constant encoding rate: |L| = |R| = O(k), where k is the length of the message.
Our technique for getting this result is of independent interest. We (a) develop a generalization of non-malleable codes, called non-malleable reductions; (b) show simple composition theorem for non-malleable reductions; (c) construct a variety of such reductions connecting various (independently interesting) tampering families F to each other; and (d) construct our final, constant-rate, non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model by applying the composition theorem to a series of easy to understand reductions.
We briefly expand on these results below, but notice that our final result uses the above mentioned recent result of Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ14] as a black-box. Without using this work, we could directly achieve a very simple linear-rate τ = O(k) non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model, which is already considerably better than the prior state-of-the-art
Non-malleable Reductions.
Recall, non-malleable codes encode the message x in a way that decoding a tampered codeword either returns x itself, or yields an "independent" message x . Abstractly, this could be viewed as "reducing" a possibly complicated family of tampering functions F to a much simpler family NM of what we call trivial tampering functions: identity function f (x) = x and constant functions f x (x) = x . More generally, given two families F and G, we can define a nonmalleable reduction from F to G -denoted (F ⇒ G) -to be a pair (E, D) of encoding/decoding functions with the property that, for any tampering function f ∈ F, the function D(f (E(·))) is "close" to a convex combination of functions g(·) for g ∈ G. With this perspective, non-malleable code w.r.t. to F is simply a non-malleable reduction (F ⇒ NM). More interestingly, and ignoring error terms, it is very easy to see that the notion of non-malleable reductions is transitive: (F ⇒ G) and (G ⇒ H) imply (F ⇒ H). Thus, to construct a non-malleable code w.r.t. to some possibly complicated family F, we can define some useful intermediate families F0 = F, F1, . . . , Fi = NM (for small constant i), and show that (F0 ⇒ F1), . . . , (Fi−1 ⇒ Fi).
Aside from improved modularity, our approach has the benefit that some of our intermediate families and reductions are rather natural and could find other applications. Additionally, if a better intermediate non-malleable reduction is found in subsequent/independent work, we could immediately get an improved result for our final non-malleable code. This is precisely what happened when we discovered the recent work of Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ14] , which, in our terminology, gave a better non-malleable reduction from O(1)-split-state family to the trivial family NM. Coupled with our already established constant-rate reduction from 2-split-state to O(1)-split-state family, the work of [CZ14] improved the rate of our final code from O(k) to O(1), giving us the desired code stated in Theorem 1.
Our Reductions.
As we mentioned, we introduce several useful intermediate families and derive a variety of non-malleable reductions relating them. From a conceptual point of view, however, we present two incomparable non-malleable reductions (each of which is composed of several sub-reductions). Both of these reductions could be interpreted as independence amplification techniques: they reduce split-state tampering of very few parts to an easier question of split-state tampering with a much larger number of parts.
Our first main result (see Theorem 18) shows a non-malleable reduction from 5-split-state tampering to t-split-state tampering, loosing only a factor O(t) in the rate of the code. In addition to the 5-split-state tampering, it can also tolerate so called "forgetful" family F OR 5 , which is allowed to (dependently) tamper all 5 memory parts as a function of any (5 − 1) = 4 memory parts. (More generally, FOR t can use any (t − 1) parts.) In turn, this reduction is composed of several sub-reductions, some of which are of independent interest (e.g., one reduction uses the alternating extraction technique of [DP07a] to reduce 2-split-state tampering to the so called family of "lookahead functions", which is a natural model for "one-pass" tampering). We defer more detailed treatment to Section 5, here only mentioning that each of our reductions is rather elementary to state (but not prove), using only general randomness extractors or the inner product function. In particular, the resulting non-malleable codes that we get using this reduction could be "efficient" not only in theory, but even in practice.
Our second main result (see Theorem 19) is a non-malleable reduction from 2-split-state tampering to the family containing t-split-state tampering and the t-part forgetful family FOR t mentioned above. This reduction loses a factor O(t 3 ) in the rate, but this is still a constant when t = O(1). Also, although the proof of this reduction is, by far, the most technically involved part of this work, the reduction itself is very simple and efficient, using only the inner product function. We defer more detailed treatment of this result to Section 6.
Applications to Non-malleable Codes.
We can now compose our main new reductions with the already known constructions of non-malleable codes for various families, to get the following new results. First, composing our reduction from 5 parts to t parts with known nonmalleable codes in the so called independent-bit tampering model (where each of the t shares is only 1 bit) [DPW10, CG14b, FMVW14] , we get a very simple linear rate nonmalleable code in the 5-split-state model. See Theorem 21.
Second, we can now compose this code with our second reduction (from 2 parts to t = 5 parts or the forgetful family FOR 5 ) to get still quite simple linear rate non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model. As we mentioned, this already considerably improves the prior state-of-the-art O(k 6 ) rate code by [ADL14, Agg15] . See Theorem 22.
Finally, instead of our own non-malleable code in the t = 5 split-state model above, we can use the beautiful recent work of [CZ14] , which uses a variety of advanced techniques to construct a constant-rate non-malleable code in the 9-splitstate model (i.e., number of parts t = 9). Composing this constant-rate code with our second reduction from 2 to t = 9 part, which only loses a constant factor in the rate, we get our final code claimed in Theorem 1 (and, formally, in Theorem 24).
Other Related Work.
Other results that look at an (enhanced) split-state model are Faust et al. [FMNV14] which consider the model where the adversary can tamper continuously, and [ADKO15] , that considers the model where the adversary, in addition to performing split-state tampering, is also allowed some limited interaction between the two states.
In fact, the result of [ADKO15] combined with our result gives a constant rate non-malleable code that also allows leakage of a 1/12-th fraction of the bits from one share of the codeword to the other. In addition to the already-mentioned results, several recent works [CCFP11, CCP12, CKM11, FMVW14, AGM + 14, AGM + 15] either used or built nonmalleable codes for various families F, but did not concentrate on the split-state model, which is our focus here.
The notion of non-malleability was introduced by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [DDN00] , and has found many applications in cryptography. Traditionally, non-malleability is defined in the computational setting, but recently non-malleability has been successfully defined and applied in the informationtheoretic setting (generally resulting in somewhat simpler and cleaner definitions than their computational counterparts). For example, in addition to non-malleable codes studied in this work, the work of Dodis and Wichs [DW09] defined the notion of non-malleable extractors as a tool for building round-efficient privacy amplification protocols.
Finally, the study of non-malleable codes falls into a much larger cryptographic framework of providing counter-measures against various classes of tampering attacks. This work was pioneered by the early works of [ISW03, GLM + 03, IPSW06], and has since led to many subsequent models. We do not list all such tampering models, but we refer to [KKS11, LL12] for an excellent discussion of various such models.
PRELIMINARIES
For a set T , let UT denote a uniform distribution over T , and, for an integer , let U denote uniform distribution over bit strings. The statistical distance between two random variables A, B is defined by
We use A ≈ε B as shorthand for ∆(A, B) ≤ ε.
The min-entropy of a random variable W is H∞(W ) def = − log(maxw Pr[W = w]), and the conditional min-entropy of W given Z is
Definition 3. We say that a function Ext :
In Section 5, we will be concerned with the case when d = n (seed length equals output length), and will use the existence of the following extractors:
). There exist constants c1 and c2, such that for any N and n satisfying n ∈ [c1 · log N, N/2], there exists an explicit, efficient
We also also use bit-extractors which extract only one bit. One such extractor is the bit inner product function W, S (which trivially follows from the Leftover Hash Lemma [HILL99] ). We state this below, for future convenience renaming the source length to n (and no longer using n for output size, as the latter is 1):
Lemma 5. The inner product function is an (n, m, n, , ε)-extractor, where ε = 2 −(m− −1)/2 .
Definition 6. We say that a function Ext :
For n being an integer multiple of m, and interpreting elements of {0, 1} m as elements from F2m and those in {0, 1} n to be from (F2m ) n/m , we have that the inner product function is a good 2-source extractor.
Lemma 7. For all positive integers m, n such that n is a multiple of m, and for all ε > 0, there exists an efficient (n, n + m + 2 log 1 ε , m, ε) 2-source extractor.
We will need the following results. The following is a simple result from [ADL14] .
Lemma 8. Let X1, Y1 ∈ A1, and Y1, Y2 ∈ A2 be random variables such that ∆((X1, X2) ; (Y1, Y2)) ≤ ε. Then, for any non-empty set A ⊆ A1, we have
The following result is from [DP07a] .
Lemma 9. Let A ∈ A and B ∈ B be two independent random variables. Let V1, V2, . . . be random variables defined as functions of A, B satisfying the following property. For all i ∈ N, if i is even then Vi = φi(V1, . . . , Vi−1, A) and if i is odd, then Vi = φi(V1, . . . , Vi−1, B) for some function φi. Then for all i, A is independent of B given V1, . . . , Vi.
The following is (a generalization of) the Vazirani's XOR Lemma.
Lemma 10. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xt) ∈ F t be a random variable, where F is a finite field of order q. Assume that for all a1, . . . , at ∈ F t not all zero, ∆(
, where U1, . . . , Ut are independent and each is uniform in F.
NON-MALLEABLE REDUCTIONS AND USEFUL TAMPERING FAMILIES
Definitions. In the following we generalize the notion of non-malleable codes w.r.t. to a tampering family F [DPW10] to a more versatile notion of non-malleable reductions from F to G.
Definition 11 (non-malleable reduction). Let F ⊂ A
A and G ⊂ B B be some classes of functions (which we call manipulation functions). We will write:
and say F reduces to G, if there exist an efficient randomized encoding function E : B → A, and an efficient deterministic decoding function D : A → B, such that (a) for all x ∈ B, we have D(E(x)) = x, and (b) for all f ∈ F , there exists G such that for all x ∈ B,
where G is a distribution over G, and G(x) denotes the distribution g(x), where g ← G.
Intuitively, (F , G, ε)-non-malleable reduction allows one to encode a value x by y ← E(x), so that tampering with y by y = f (y) for f ∈ F gets "reduced" (by the decoding function D(y ) = x ) to tampering with x itself via some (distribution over) g ∈ G.
In particular, the notion of non-malleable code w.r.t. F, is simply a reduction from F to the family of "trivial manipulation functions" NM k defined below.
Definition 12. Let NM k denote the set of trivial manipulation functions on k-bit strings, which consists of the identity function I(x) = x and all constant functions fc(x) = c, where c ∈ {0, 1} k . We say that a pair (E, D) defines an (F, k, ε)-non-malleable code, if it defines a (F, NM k , ε)-non-malleable reduction.
Remark 1. The above definition might seem a little different than the definition of [DPW10] (who required a simulator outputting a distribution over constants c ∈ {0, 1} k , a special symbol "same", serving as a disguise for the identity function, and another special symbol ⊥). The symbol ⊥ is meant to indicate that the tampered codeword is invalid, and facilitates one to view non-malleable codes as a relaxation of error-detecting codes, where one wants to detect tampering. However, one can equivalently consider the non-malleable code defintion without ⊥, simply by replacing the "bottom output" ⊥ by a fixed message whenever the simulator or decoder outputs ⊥. We formally discuss this issue in the full version, where we also show the equivalence between the definition of non-malleable code presented here and the one in [DPW10] .
Remark 2. Notice, the "complexity" of the initial tampering family F intuitively corresponds to the complexity of the attacker on our system. Hence, when F consists of efficient functions (and so does the target family G; e.g. G = NM k ), it could be useful to require that the distribution G over G is efficiently samplable given oracle access to f ∈ F . However, we do not insist on this for two reasons: (1) our final tampering family F (the split-state family) will consist of arbitrary and possibly inefficient functions f , making the efficiency requirement on G less motivated; and, more importantly, (2) for the reduction from any family F to the trivial family NM k (which is our final goal), the requirement that G is efficiently samplable (given oracle access to f ∈ F) can be anyway ensured with mild loss of parameters, as already observed by [CG14b] . We formally state this in Lemma 13 (for a proof, see the full version). Hence, we will keep our simpler definition, but stress that our final distribution G (when G = NM k ) could be made efficiently samplable, by Lemma 13.
2 k , and G is efficiently samplable given oracle access to f .
We also give a related useful notion of non-malleable transformations, where the F-tampering is applied to uniformly random strings in A, and gets transformed (by some "transformation function" T ) to G-tampering over uniformly random strings in B.
Definition 14 (non-malleable transformation). Let F ⊂ A
A and G ⊂ B B be some classes of manipulation functions. We will write:
and say F transforms to G, if there exists an efficient transformation function T : A → B such that for all f ∈ F there exists G such that:
The function T is called (F , G, ε)-non-malleable transformation.
Remark 3. Equation (2) implies the following analog of "correctness": ∆ T (UA); UB ≤ ε.
The utility of non-malleable reductions and transformations comes from the following natural composition theorem, which allows to gradually make our tampering families simpler and simpler, until we eventually end up with a nonmalleable code (corresponding to the trivial family NM k ). The proof is available in the full version. (F → G, ε1) and
Theorem 15 (Composition). (a) If
We will also need the following trivial observation.
Observation 1 (Union). Let (E, D) be an (F, H, ε) and a (G, H, ε ) non-malleable reduction (resp. transformation). Then (E, D) is an (F∪G, H, max(ε, ε ) ) non-malleable reduction (resp. transformation).
It is an easy observation that the decoding function in a non-malleable reduction is also a non-malleable transformation, provided it maps uniform strings to uniform strings (which is not always the case). The following result shows that for any efficiently invertible non-malleable transformation T , the pair (T −1 , T ) is a non-malleable reduction. The proof is deferred to the full version.
Useful Tampering Families. We define several natural tampering families we will use in this work. For this, we first introduce the following "direct product" operator on tampering families:
let F × G denote the class of functions h from (A × B)
A×B such that
for some h1 ∈ F and h2 ∈ G and x = x1||x2, where x1 ∈ A, x2 ∈ B.
We also let F 1 := F, and, for t ≥ 1,
We can now define the following tampering families:
• Sn = ({0, 1} n )
{0,1}
n denote the class of all manipulation functions on n-bit strings.
• Given t > 1, S t n denotes the tampering family in the t-split-state model, where the attacker can apply t arbitrarily correlated functions h1, . . . , ht to t separate, n-bit parts of memory (but, of course, each hi can only be applied to the i-th part individually).
• FOR t n denotes forgetful family. It is applied to t parts of memory of length n but the output value can depend only on (t − 1) parts. More precisely: Let x ∈ {0, 1} tn be a bit vector and xi ∈ {0, 1} n denote i-th block of n bits. For any h ∈ FOR t n there exist a subset S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , t} of size (t − 1) such that h(x) can be evaluated from xS. Besides that, it is not restricted in any way.
• Finally, LA ←t n ⊂ ({0, 1} tn )
tn denotes the class of lookahead manipulation functions l that can be rewritten as l = (l1, . . . , lt), for li : {0, 1}
in → {0, 1} n , where l(x) = l1(x1)||l2(x1, x2)|| . . . ||lt(x1, . . . , xt) for x = x1||x2|| . . . ||xt, and xi ∈ {0, 1} n . In other words, if l(x1, . . . , xt) = y1, . . . , yt, then each yi can only depend on the "prior" x1, . . . , xi. 
OUR REDUCTIONS AND APPLICATION TO NON-MALLEABLE CODES
In this Section, we state our main reductions. Both our reductions could be interpreted as independence amplification techniques: they reduce split-state tampering of very few parts to an easier question of split-state tampering with a much larger number of parts. Our first result shows a non-malleable reduction from 5-split-state tampering to tsplit-state tampering.
−Ω(tn) ).
In our second result, we show a non-malleable reduction from 2-split-state tampering to the family containing t-splitstate tampering and the t-part forgetful family.
−Ω(n) ).
Theorem 18 will be proved in Section 5 and Theorem 19 will be proved in Section 6.
Application to Non-malleable Codes.
We can compose the reduction in Theorem 18 with the already known constructions [DPW10, CG14b, FMVW14, AGM
+ 15] of non-malleable codes in the independent-bit tampering model (i.e. for tampering families S k 1 ). In particular, the construction of [CG14b] gives the following.
Using Theorem 15, and Theorem 18 with t = k, and n = 1, we get the following result:
−Ω(k) ). In particular, there exists an effi-
We can compose this with Theorem 19, to reduce the number of parts from 5 to 2 by increasing the length of the codewords by a constant factor.
This result already dramatically improves upon the pre- Agg15] . However, we can further improve our non-malleable code using a recent work of Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ14] . [CZ14] obtained a construction of non-malleable codes with constant rate in the 9-split-state model. Their construction was achieved using a connection of t-source non-malleable extractors to non-malleable codes in the t-split-state model shown in [CG14b] . We observe that if the extractor is also a strong extractor (which is the case for [CZ14] ), then the corresponding code is also nonmalleable against the forgetful family. The details can be found in the full version, but they imply the following result:
Combining this with our reduction given in Theorem 19, we get our main result.
Remark 4. Clearly, from the asymptotic sense, Theorem 24 is superior to Theorem 22 (which is in turn superior to Theorem 21). However, the constant factors hidden inside the result of [CZ14] (i.e., Theorem 23) used to prove Theorem 24 are really large, as the rely on some existential results in additive combinatorics. Thus, in many concrete situations the code constructed in Theorem 22 (which was done independently from the work of [CZ14] ) would be superior to the asymptotically better code obtained in Theorem 24. To a lesser extent, when increasing the number of independent parts from 2 to 5 is feasible, the simple 5-part code in Theorem 21 will likely be more efficient than the code in Theorem 22.
NON-MALLEABLE REDUCTION FROM 5 PARTS TO T PARTS
In this Section, we sketch the proof of Theorem 18. The detailed proof can be found in the full version. We prove it by a sequence of simpler intermediate reductions/transformations (some of which could be of independent interest), and then applying the composition theorem (Theorem 15). We now specify the intermediate steps, leaving the proofs of corresponding theorems to subsequent subsections.
Our first result is a transformation from 2-split-state model to the "t-lootahead model". Namely, we gain in introducing many parts, at the expense of dealing with more challenging tampering functions on each part (as compared to the split-state model).
The proof is given in the full version, but here we briefly sketch the definition of the required transformation T1. It is based on the alternating extraction protocol [DP07b] . The first memory part stores random strings Q, R0, the second memory part stores random W (where |Q| = |W | ≈ 2tn and |R0| = n), and we let
where each Ri is iteratively defined by using Ri−1 to extract Si−1 from W , and then Si−1 to extract Ri from Q. Next, we show how to transform two independent t-lookahead tampering families to the t-split-state tampering family (and, for future use, the forgetful family).
Theorem 26 (2-lookahead to t-split). If n ≥ 2tm, then
The proof appears in the full version, but here we only mention the definition of the transformation T2 we construct. Let Ext2 be any (n, n/2, n, m, 2 −(n−2m−2)/4 )-extractor (e.g., the inner product), and define
where L = (L1|| . . . ||Lt), R = (R1|| . . . ||Rt), Li, Ri ∈ {0, 1} n . As a direct corollary of Theorems 25 and 26, we get a transformation from 4-split-state model to t-split state model:
−Ω(tn) ). Now, it is tempting to use Theorem 16 to get a nonmalleable reduction from S 4 6t 2 n to S t n . Unfortunately, we do not know how to turn the non-malleable transformation in Theorem 27 into a reduction (i.e., how to efficiently invert T in Theorem 27, and then apply Theorem 16). Instead, we observe the following very general result allowing us to translate a non-malleable transformation from any F to t-split tampering S t n , into a non-malleable reduction from F ×Sn to S t n . Namely, in the t-split model, we go from transformation to reduction at the expense of another "split-state part" Sn.
In particular, using the transformation in Theorem 27, we get
The proof is in the full version, and here we briefly mention the reduction (E, D) as a function of the transformation T . To encode a value x ∈ {0, 1} tn , we pick a random y in the domain of F, and let
Of course, by using "dummy" bits to extend the 5-th part from tn bits to O(6t 2 n) bits, we get a reduction from 5-split-state model to t-split state model. Also, to prove Theorem 18, we additionally need to argue that our final encoding scheme is can also handle the forgetful family F OR 5 6t 2 n . To see this, let the five parts encoding x be (Q, R0), W, (P, L0), V, d such that T1((Q, R0), W ) = (R1, . . . , Rt), T1((P, L0), V ) = (L1, . . . , Lt), and x = d ⊕ T2(L, R). We observe that a stronger 5-out-of-5 secret sharing property holds, i.e., that any 4 of the 5-parts, it is impossible to guess x except with probability 2
−Ω(tn) . This is obvious if we are given the first four parts but "forget" the fifth part. We sketch here why this is sufficient even if we forget one of the other four parts. Without loss of generality, assume that we are given (P, L0), V and one of (Q, R0) or W . Thus, L1, . . . , Lt is completely known, but we show that conditioned on this information, R1, . . . , Rt is like a block-source, i.e. for all i ∈ [t], if we are additionally given R1, . . . , Ri−1, then the string Ri still has sufficient min-entropy. This implies that Ext2(Li, Ri) is close to uniform given Ext2 (L1, R1) , . . . , Ext2(Li−1, Ri−1), and hence the required result follows by a hybrid argument. To argue that R1, . . . , Rt is indeed a block-source we proceed as follows.
CASE 1: We are given W . In this case, a stronger condition holds, i.e. that R1, . . . , Rt is close to uniform. This follows from the alternating extraction theorem [DP07a, DW09] .
CASE 2: We are given (Q, R0) Assume that R1, . . . , Rt is not a block-source. In this case, Ri has small minentropy given R1, . . . , Ri−1. This implies that at the end of i − 1 rounds of the alternating extraction protocol, Quentin can guess Ri with high probability. Now assume that Aw is honest, and Aq honestly follows the protocol for the first i−1 rounds, and sends R0, . . . , Ri−2, but then in the i-th round, guesses and sends Ri. This contradicts the fact that (V 
NON-MALLEABLE REDUCTION FROM 2 PARTS TO T PARTS
In this Section, we prove Theorem 19. We observe that Theorem 19 immediately follows by applying the composition Theorem 15 to Theorem 26 and the following result:
This result can be seen as strengthening of Theorem 25. Namely, while Theorem 25 reduced 2-split-state tampering to a single lookahead tampering, in our new reduction we manage to reduce it to two independent lookahead tamperings.
2
To prove Theorem 29, we need to define encoding and decoding functions (see Definition 11) and prove that they satisfy the required conditions for non-malleable reductions. Correspondingly, in Section 6.1 we will first define our efficient reduction, and then give the ideas for the security proof by stating the high-level proof structure in Section 6.2 and defining the intermediate "partition objects" we need in Section 6.3. The low-level technical lemmas about these "partition objects" appear in the full version.
Construction
Now, we will define an encoding scheme from {0, 1} nt to {0, 1} tα(n+3ts) × {0, 1} tα(n+3ts) for α = 10t 2 + 10t + 10. 3 For brevity we will consider L = R = {0, 1} tα(n+3ts) and write
(n+3ts) be the inner-product extractor, which is an i(n + 3ts), (i + 1)(n + 3ts) + 2 log 1 ε , n + 3ts, ε -two-source extractor. We slightly abuse notation here, and any element in {0, 1}
(n+3ts)i for any integer i should be considered as the corresponding element (w.r.t. any bijective mapping) to an element in F i 2 n+3ts , whenever we take inner products. For i ∈ {1, 2, ..., t} let hi : {0, 1}
(n+3ts) → {0, 1} n ∪ {⊥} be defined as hi(x) = (x)n if x is the binary expansion of an integer less than 2 n+3(i−1)s , and hi(x) = ⊥, otherwise. (Where (.) λ denotes truncation to λ least significant bits.) Using this, our encoding and decoding functions are defined as follows. ( 1, r1) ) . . . ht(Ext( t, rt)) , otherwise.
Definition 31. The encoding function E : ({0, 1} n ) t → L × R, on input x ∈ ({0, 1} n ) t , is naturally defined as the output of the following sampling procedure.
2. Return (L, R).
Our construction uses some ideas from a recent result [ADKO15] , which showed a reduction from 2-split non-malleable codes with leakage to 2-split non-malleable codes (with the possibility that the two tampered parts are swapped). Also, our proof uses a similar framework. In particular, the partitioning procedure is similar. The crucial difference is that the proof of [ADKO15] was tailor-made to work for a reduction from 2 parts to 2 parts, and does not generalize easily. We crucially needed to introduce the intermediate two-lookahead family and then compose it with our reduction in Theorem 26 in order to generalize it to a reduction from 2 parts to t parts and hence conclude our result.
We would like to mention here that although we manage to prove a weaker result (which is sufficient for our purpose), we believe that our reduction from Theorem 29 is actually a reduction from S 2 10t(t 2 +t+1)(n+3ts) to S t n ∪ FOR t n . If one manages to prove this, then this immediately implies Theorem 19 without having to compose it with the reduction in Theorem 26. In addition to simplifying the proof, this will result in saving a constant factor in the overall code rate.
Proof Structure of Theorem 29
From the definition, it is obvious that for all x ∈ ({0, 1} n ) t , we have that Pr(D(E(x)) = x) = 1. So, to prove theorem 29, we need to prove that for all f ∈ L L , g ∈ R R , and for all x ∈ ({0, 1} n ) t , there exists a random function P distributed over (LA
where
For the rest of this section, we fix the following notation.
. For ∈ L, we write f ( ) as f ( ) = f1( ) . . . ft( ), where fi( ) ∈ {0, 1} α(n+3ts) . We use similar notation for the parts of g(r). Similarly, we write L = L1 . . . Lt. Also, we use similar notation for R.
The following simple lemma shows that it suffices to prove (5) for partitions of the ambient space. A similar idea was used both in [DKO13] , and in [ADL14] , and we include the proof in the full version for completeness.
L and let S ⊆ L×R. Let S1, . . . , Sj be a partition of S. Also, let P1, . . . , Pj be some random functions distributed over (LA
The main idea is to use Lemma 32 for a specific partition of L×R. In fact, we give a partition for L and independently a partition for R. Then the final partition of L × R is a Cartesian product of these two partitions.
More precisely, we partition the set L into the following
Similarly, we partition R (specific definitions are gathered in Section 6.3). Thus, the total number of parts of L × R we consider are O(t 4 ). We will show that for each part L * × R * considered, either
Thus, using Lemma 32 we have that
which finishes the proof. The partitioning procedure is quite extensive but then the proof for each partition will follow from the two-source extractor property of Ext. We will describe the partitioning procedure here, and the proof for each partition is deferred to the full version.
Partition
Now we define a partition of L based on f . Let β1 = 2t 2 (n + 3ts) + 2ts + t, and let β2 = (2t + 4)(n + 3ts) + 4s + 2.
"Far from bijection" parts.
First, we partition L into L ffb,1 , . . . , L ffb,t , and L1. We will define L ffb,1 , . . . , L ffb,t inductively as follows. The set L ffb,i is obtained by the following algorithm. The set L1 is defined to be
L ffb,i . and will be partitioned later.
The justification for this choice is that forL chosen uniformly at random from L ffb,i , we have H∞(Li|f (L)) ≥ β1 t .
Also, we have that for any y ∈ {0, 1} α(n+3ts) , the total number of ∈ L1 such that f ( ) = y is at most 2 β 1 t t = 2 β 1 .
We further partition the set L1 depending on how different parts of f ( ) depend on different parts of for ∈ L1. Before doing this, we need the following definition.
Definition 33. Define T i→j ⊂ L as the set of all ∈ L such that * ∈ L i = * i and fj( ) = fj( * ) ≥ 2 (t−1)α(n+3ts)−β 2 .
We will define a partitioning of L1 using Definition 33, but before we do this, we prove the following simple result justifying the definition of T i→j . Intuitively, this result shows that if it is given that ∈ T i→j , then fj( ) can be computed given i and just a little more information. The proof is available in the full version.
Lemma 34. Let ∈ T i→j for some i, j ∈ [t]. Then there exists some functions ai,j : T i→j → {0, 1} β 2 and bi,j : {0, 1} α(n+3ts) × {0, 1} β 2 → {0, 1} α(n+3ts) such that for all ∈ T i→j , fj( ) = bi,j( i, ai,j( )) .
"Mixed" parts.
Now we define disjoint subsets L mix,1 , . . . , L mix,t of L1 as follows.
T i→j for j = 1, . . . , t .
Informally speaking, ∈ L mix,j implies that fj( ) depends on more than one i. Now, let
L mix,k .
"id", "permuted" and "remaining" parts.
We denote T ( , i) to be the set of all j ∈ [t] such that ∈ T i→j . Note that if A ⊂ L2 then by the definition of L mix,j , we have that for every j ∈ [t] must belong to some T ( , i).
Let Bi←j be set of permutations π of [t] such that ∀i < i, π(i ) = i and π(j) = i. Also let ≺ denote standard lexicographic order. We further partition L2 into L Id , and Lperm,i←j for i, j ∈ [t], and Lrem as follows. 
Final partition.
We similarly define the partitioning of R based on g. The final partition of L × R is a Cartesian product of these two partitions.
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We have built the first efficient, information-theoretically secure non-malleable codes in the split-state model with constant encoding rate. Although asymptotically optimal, the constant we achieve appears astronomical, as it relies on some results in additive combinatorics from [CZ14] . In contrast, we know existentially that the optimal rate is equal to 2. Closing this gap is an interesting open problem.
We have also introduced the notion of non-malleable reductions, and showed that they allow to build non-malleable codes in a modular manner. We hope that our modularity will find further applications in the design of other nonmalleable codes.
